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Abstract 
Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) is used in the oil and gas industry to 
detect the onset of hazardous events and/or to mitigate their consequences to 
humans, material assets, and the environment. International standards have 
been developed to ensure that a SIS is designed, implemented and operated 
according to the specified needs. Safety and reliability assessments play an 
important role in SIS design, construction and operation. 
In this thesis there is carried out a reliability study of the BOP control 
system on Deepsea Atlantic (DSA) with use of the international IEC 61508 
standard and the Norwegian PDS guidelines. All the results show that the 
BOP control system is within the requirements given by OLF 070.  
The results from a reliability study will vary because of different 
interpretations in the guidelines. Factors that contribute to a change in the 
unavailability is identified in both methods and highlighted with examples 
throughout this thesis. The major difference between the two methods is that 
PDS guidelines include more details in the calculation of Common Cause 
Failure (CCF). In a calculation example given in this thesis, the two 
guidelines conclude against different Safety Integrity Levels (SILs). 
If decision makers are not aware of assumptions and conditions in the 
methods, they may misinterpret the results and select a SIS design that is 
either too complex or too simple to provide necessary risk reduction.  
In the oil and gas industry it is common to define and describe risk using 
probabilities and probability distributions. The Probability of Failure on 
Demand (PFD) gives a useful insight for decision makers. After presenting 
several examples of how different interpretations in the methods results in 
different SIL verification, I argue that there is a need for broader reflection 
of robustness and uncertainties, which can support decision makers when 
verifying against SIL requirements. Therefore, I present some new ideas of 
how one can merge existing approaches to support decision making. Today, 
it seems to exist no overall agreement or guidelines of how one can verify 
the PFD against the SIL requirements.  
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Terminology and concepts 
Average 
Probability of 
Dangerous 
Failure On 
Demand 
Mean unavailability of an E/E/PE safety- related system 
to perform the specified safety function when a demand 
occurs from Equipment Under Control (EUC) or EUC 
control system (IEC 61508-4 2010). 
Blowout 
Preventer control 
system 
A Blowout Preventer control system comprises a 
number of valves that should be closed during an 
emergency to prevent uncontrolled well-fluid to flow 
onto the platform during drilling operations (Bai 2010). 
Common Cause 
Failure  
 
Failure, which can result in one or more events, causing 
coincident failures of two or more separate channels in 
a multiple channel system, leading to system failure 
(IEC 61508-4 2010). 
Dangerous 
undetected 
 
Dangerous failures not detected by automatic self- test 
or incidentally by personnel (I.e. revealed only by 
functional test or upon a demand) (Hauge et al. 2010). 
E/E/PE system  
 
System for control, protection, or monitoring based on 
one or more electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic (E/E/PE) devices, including all elements of 
the system such as power supplies, sensors, and other 
input devices, data highways and other communication 
paths, and actuators and other output devices. (IEC 
61508-4 2010). 
 ix 
 
 
 
Generic data 
 
Data that represent a property, for example the failure 
rate, for a group of similar components. Generic data 
may be based on experience data or predicted data 
(Lundteigen 2009). 
Low demand  
system 
 
A low demand safety system operates only upon a 
demand, can often be seen as an add-on to the basic 
control system, and shall only be called upon when 
something goes wrong or starts to go wrong. Typical 
examples are a Process Shutdown system (PSD), 
Blowout Preventer (BOP) control system, or an 
Emergency Shutdown system (ESD) (Hauge et al. 
2010). 
Model 
 
The model represents our interpretation of some real 
phenomena (Lundteigen 2009). 
MooN 
 
A MooN voting (M<N) means that at least M of the N 
redundant modules have to give a shutdown signal for a 
shutdown to be activated (Hauge et al. 2010). 
Probability of 
Test Independ-
ence Failure 
 
The probability that the component/system will fail to 
carry out its intended function due to a (latent) failure 
not detectable by functional testing (Hauge et al. 2010). 
Random 
Hardware failure 
 
Failure, occurring at a random time, which results from 
one or more of the possible degradation mechanisms in 
the hardware (IEC 61508-4 2010). 
Redundancy In an item, the existence of more than one means for 
performing a required function (IEC 61508-4 2010). 
 x 
 
 
 
Reliability 
 
The ability of a system to function as planned, and is 
expressed by probabilities and expected values (Aven 
2006). 
Risk 
 
The two- dimensional combination of (i) events A and 
the consequences of these events C, and (ii) the 
associated uncertainties U (about what will be 
outcome), i.e. (C,U). For simplicity, we write only C, 
instead of A and C (Aven 2008). 
Risk acceptance 
criteria  
 
If the calculated risk is lower than a pre- determined 
value, then the risk is acceptable (tolerable) (Aven 
2008). 
Safety barrier 
 
A safety barrier is often interpreted as a function which 
must be fulfilled in order to reduce the risk, and such a 
function can be implemented in terms of different 
systems and elements, both technical and operational 
(OLF 2004). 
Safety Instru-
mented Systems 
 
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) comprises input 
elements (e.g. pressure transmitters and gas detectors), 
logic solvers (e.g. relay-based logic and programmable 
logic controllers) and final elements (e.g. valves, 
circuit’s breakers) for the purpose of bringing the plant 
or equipment to a safe state if a hazardous event occurs 
(Lundteigen 2009). 
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Safety Integrity 
 
Probability of an E/E/PE safety- related system 
satisfactorily performing the specified safety functions 
under all the stated conditions within a stated period of 
time (IEC 61508-4 2010). 
Safety Integrity 
Level 
 
Discrete level (one out of a possible four), 
corresponding to a range of safety integrity values, 
where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of 
safety integrity and safety level 1 has the lowest (IEC 
61508-4 2010). 
Systematic 
failure 
 
Failure, related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, 
which can only be eliminated by a modification of the 
design or of the manufacturing process, operational 
procedures, documentation or other relevant factor (IEC 
61508-4 2010). 
Vendor data Is in this thesis vendor data is defined as supplier and 
contactor specific data. 
Voting 
 
The number of redundant means that need to operate for 
the function to be accomplished (IEC 61508-4 2010). 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Safety instrumented systems (SISs) are used in the oil and gas industry to 
detect the onset of hazardous events and/or to mitigate their consequences to 
humans, material assets, and the environment (Lundteigen 2009). The main 
purpose of a SIS is to bring the plant or equipment to a safe state if a haz-
ardous event occurs. If the SIS fails to perform the intended functions, the 
event may develop into an accident. Safety and reliability assessments play 
an important role in SIS design, construction and operation. 
In this thesis there will be performed a reliability study of the low demand 
Blowout Preventer (BOP) control system on Deepsea Atlantic (DSA), 
where the system will be analyzed against requirements given by OLF 070. 
International standards have been developed to ensure that SIS is designed, 
implemented and operated according to the specified needs. The interna-
tional standard, IEC 61508 and the Norwegian PDS method will be used as 
guidelines in the reliability calculations.  
Several examples will be presented to highlight the different interpretations 
in the guidelines, and to show how this can influence the PFD results and 
verification against Safety Integrity Level (SIL). 
In the oil and gas industry it is common to define and describe risk using 
probabilities and probability distributions (Aven 2010). However, these 
perspectives have been challenged in recent literature (Rosa 1998) (Aven 
2009a, 2009b) (Mosleh & Bier 1996). The PFD calculations give a useful 
insight for decision makers, but making conclusion against SIL only based 
on probability calculations, could produce poor and in some scenarios 
misleading results (Aven 2010).  
 13 
 
 
1.2 Objective 
The purpose of this assignment is to take a closer look at how the different 
reliability interpretations are covered in IEC 61508 and PDS, and how this 
can influence the calculations, which again can lead to different conclusions. 
A simplified BOP control system model for Deepsea Atlantic will be built 
and used in a reliability study to verify and conclude against specific SIL 
requirements.  
For a reliability analyst and decision makers it is seen as important to have 
some background knowledge of factors that will and can influence the 
reliability calculation. Therefore the thesis also aims to identify the most 
critical factor that can influence the reliability result. 
The thesis also aims to develop and discuss some new ideas that can be used 
when the reliability result is verified against the requirements.  
The four objectives in this thesis are summarized under: 
1. Highlight with examples that with use of IEC 61508 and PDS 
method the result can differ, and this may lead to different 
conclusion based on SIL verification. 
2. Determine if the BOP control system on DSA is within SIL 
requirements given by OLF 070. 
3. Identify factors that influence the PFD calculation in the 
reliability guidelines. 
4. Develop new ideas to an approach that aim to support decision 
making when SIL is verified. 
All the objectives will be concluded against in chapter 9. 
 14 
 
1.3 Limitations 
In this section the limitations in the assignment is presented.  
- The IEC 61508 guideline presents Safe Failure Fraction (SFF), Test 
Coverage (TC) and Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT), when the PFD 
is verified against SIL requirements. In this thesis these aspect are 
left out. 
- An application specific calculation with use of IEC 61508 guidelines 
has not been performed. The approach is to complex and in some 
extent unclear. 
- Both IEC 61508 and PDS guidelines present downtime due to 
known repair or test. In the IEC standard this is given by the PFDk, 
while in PDS as Downtime unavailability. A BOP control system 
can be seen as a non- reparable system, which means that faults only 
can be identified by testing or demands. Therefore the Mean Time 
To Repair (MTTR) is seen as low and can be neglected. 
- The PFD results on the BOP control system will only be presented in 
a table in chapter 5.2, which means that all the calculation will not 
be showed or explained in a detailed way. For further information on 
those topics, the reader is referred to OLF (2004), Onhus (2010), 
Stein Hauge (2010), Lundteigen (2010) and IEC (2010, part 6 and 
7). 
- The original BOP control system model (Chapter 4) includes an 
independent acoustic control system and 3 ram preventers (OD&T 
2010). In the RBD only 1 ram preventer is considered and the 
acoustic system is not considered. If the acoustic control system and 
all ram preventers were considered in the reliability study, the 
system PFD would be lower. This is because the acoustic system and 
ram preventers would give more redundancy to the system.  
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1.4 Structure of the report 
This section includes a short presentation of the chapters in this thesis.  
CHAPTER 2  
Important theoretical background information is presented. For a more 
detailed description see the corresponding references. 
CHAPTER 3 
An introduction to the IEC 61508 and PDS guidelines is given, with focus 
on the different interpretations in the guidelines. 
The chapter also includes a simplified example of how common cause 
failures are calculated by use of the different methods. 
CHAPTER 4 
A reliability block diagram (RBD) of the BOP control system on Deepsea 
Atlantic is made and presented.  
CHAPTHER 5 
The reliability of the BOP control system is calculated with use of both the 
IEC 61508 and PDS guidelines.  
The results also include an application specific approach by PDS. 
CHAPTER 6 
This chapter aims to highlight assumptions and limitations in reliability 
calculations. 
It demonstrates with several examples that with use of the different 
reliability guidelines (PDS and IEC 61508) the result and conclusion against 
SIL can differ. 
The chapter also includes an overview of which factors that can influence 
the reliability calculations. 
CHAPTER 7 
New ideas of how one can merge existing approaches to help decision 
makers when SIL is verified against the requirements are presented. The 
new ideas are then illustrated by use of an example. 
Strengths and weaknesses with the new ideas and existing approaches is 
also discussed.  
 16 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Reflection around topics that need to be studied and addressed more in 
reliability research is highlighted. 
This chapter also includes an overview of the most important findings in 
this thesis. 
CHAPTER 9 
This chapter includes conclusion against all the objectives which was stated 
in chapter 1.2. 
Reflections, examples, results and conclusions which are seen as important 
to the reader will be marked in outside borders (boxes) throughout this 
thesis. 
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2.0 Theory 
This chapter includes an introduction to reliability and risk analysis with a 
main focus on risk perspective, SISs and SILs. A BOP control system will 
also be described from a SIS perspective and the associated SIL 
requirements will be presented. 
2.1 Reliability and Risk Analysis 
The overall requirements for barrier and safety functions are in Norway 
provided by the national authorities. The offshore industry shall adhere to 
the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) regulations. The main requirements 
for the Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are found in the PSA activity 
regulation, the management regulation, the facility regulation and in OLF 
070. 
Analysis of reliability and risk is an important and integrated part of 
planning, construction and operation of all technical systems. The primary 
objective of reliability and risk analysis is to provide a basis for decisions 
regarding choice and actions (Aven 2006). 
Safety and reliability assessments are used to provide SIS designers, SIS 
manufacturers, and end users with decision support regarding SIS design, 
construction, and follow-up. The assessments build on a number of 
assumptions about the system and under what conditions it is to be operated. 
If decision makers are not aware of those assumptions and conditions, they 
may misinterpret the results and select a SIS design that is either too 
complex or too simple to provide necessary risk reduction (Lundteigen 
2009). 
 18 
 
 
 
Aven (2009) argue that the traditional quantitative approach in risk and 
reliability analysis provide a rather narrow risk picture, through calculated 
probabilities and expected values. Aven (2009) conclude that the approach 
should be used with care, in particular for problems with large uncertainties. 
This traditional reliability (quantification) approach is the leading approach 
when it comes to reliability analysis (IEC 61508 and PDS guidelines) on the 
NCS.  
Therefore Aven (2009) argue that it is important to look beyond these 
assigned probabilities when making important decisions. 
Both uncertainty and sensitivity are two topics that are commonly referred 
to in the concept of reliability engineering. Sensitivity analysis is often 
mentioned in the same context as uncertainty analysis, but the two types of 
analysis have slightly different meaning (Lundteigen 2009). While 
uncertainty analysis is a tool for evaluating the degree of knowledge or 
confidence in the results, the sensitivity analysis is used to improve the way 
to interpret the results (Lundteigen 2009). When performing sensitivity 
analysis, it is investigated how variations in input data (model input 
parameters, assumptions) cause changes to the model output parameters 
(Lundteigen 2009). 
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2.1.1 Risk perspective 
Many definitions and description of risk exists in an engineering context. 
Therefore, I have chosen to describe which risk perspective that is used in 
this thesis. Most of the existing definitions and descriptions of risk include 
the following three components (Aven 2011): 
 
- A: What can go wrong (the initiated events) 
- C: The consequences of these events if they should occur 
- P: The probabilities of A and C 
 
There are basically two ways of interpreting the probability P: 
 
- (a)  as a relative frequency, i.e. the relative fraction of times the 
event occurs if the situation analyzed were hypothetically “repeated” 
an infinite number of times. 
- (b)  as a subjective measure of uncertainty, conditional on the back-
ground knowledge.  
  
In this thesis I adopted the ACP perspective from Aven (2008, 2011) which 
means that there are not uncertainties associated with the results from 
probability calculation, but in the background knowledge, which can pro-
duce surprising outcomes (                      ). 
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2.2 Safety Instrumented System 
Safety instrumented systems are used in the oil and gas industry to detect 
the onset of hazardous events and/or to mitigate their consequences to 
humans, material assets, and the environment (Lundteigen 2009). 
Our safety is increasingly taken care of by SISs, where electrical, electronic 
and/or programmable (E/E/PE) devices interact with mechanical, pneumatic 
and hydraulic systems.  
A SIS comprises input elements (e.g. pressure transmitters and gas 
detectors), logic solvers (e.g. relay- based logic and programmable logic 
controllers) and final elements (e.g. valves, circuit’s breakers) for the 
purpose of bringing the plant or equipment to a safe state if hazardous event 
occurs (Lundteigen 2009) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Example of a SIS 
If the SIS fails to perform the intended functions, an incident or event may 
develop into an accident. 
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It can in some situations be important to distinguish between a SIS and a 
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). The system is the technology (and 
human) elements, while the function describes the acts performed by the 
system. The relationship between a SIF and a SIS is illustrated in Figure 2 
(Lundteigen 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the difference between a SIS and a SIF 
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2.2.1 BOP control system as a SIS 
With the increased recognition of the IEC standards, many oil companies 
assign SIL requirements to other safety critical systems, such as well inter-
vention and drilling systems. For those systems, it is often important to also 
focus on the rate of spurious
1
 activations as they may lead to hazardous 
events. Whereas traditional SISs often have a well defined safe state, this is 
not always the case for other safety critical systems (Lundteigen 2009). 
Theoretically, a BOP control system is not defined as a SIS because the 
system does not include all the aspect in the definition. But in “real” life the 
BOP control system is a safety critical system with regards to well control 
and therefore treated like a SIS. It is more correct to define a BOP control 
system as a SIF within a SIS.   
The BOP control system is an example of a system where manual activation 
is normally preferred to automatic. When there is sufficient time for human 
judgment or in cases where an unintended or spurious activation may have 
very severe consequences, a manual activation may be preferred to automat-
ic. The reason is that a spurious operation of the BOP during a drilling oper-
ation may create new hazardous events. To make sure that manual activation 
is possible in different types of critical events, there are pushbuttons in-
stalled in several locations in and near the drilling area.  
 
                                                          
1
 Spurious Activations:  A collective term used to characterize an improper, false, or non-
genuine transaction from one state to another (Lundteigen 2009) 
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2.3 Safety Integrity 
In IEC 61508 the safety integrity are divided into four requirement levels, 
called SIL. Table 1 shows the SILs for safety functions operating on 
demand and in a continuous demand mode (IEC 61508-1 2010).  
 
Safety Integrity Level Demand Mode of 
Operations (average 
probability of failure 
to perform its design 
functions on demand- 
PFD) 
Continuous / High 
Demand Mode of 
Operation 
(probability of a 
dangerous failure per 
hour) 
4 ≥ 10-5 to < 10-4 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-8 
3 ≥ 10-4 to < 10-3 ≥ 10-8 to < 10-7 
2 ≥ 10-3 to < 10-2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6 
1 ≥ 10-2 to < 10-1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5 
Table 1.SIL intervals for systems operating on low demand and/or high demand 
A SIS is defined as operation in high demand mode if demanded more than 
once per year, and as low demand mode if demanded less than once per 
year. If the safety function is a part of normal operations, it is defined as 
operating in the continuous mode (IEC 61508-1 2010). 
 
A BOP control system can be defined as a low demand operation system, 
because the main function of the system is to close relevant valves on de-
mand and the frequency is less than once per year. 
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2.3.1 SIL requirements for BOP a control system 
SIL requirements for BOP/ BOP control system are presented in the 
application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum 
industry by OLF 070 (2004).  
Table 2 shows the minimum SIL requirements for drilling related safety 
functions. 
Safety functions SIL Functions boundaries 
for given SIL 
requirement / 
comments 
Drilling BOP 2
2 Annular/ pipe ram 
functions 
Closing of relevant 
BOP valve(s) in order 
to prevent blowout 
and/or well leak 
2
2
 Blind shear ram function 
Table 2.SIL requirements for BOP control system and BOP stack 
It is important to emphasis that the tabulated SIL requirements are minimum 
values, and therefore need to be verified with respect to overall risk level 
(OLF 2004).  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The total safety functions include activation from drillers console or tool pusher console, 
and the remotely operated valves needed to close the BOP sufficiently to prevent blowout 
and/ or well leaks (OLF 2004) 
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3.0 Reliability guidelines 
Both the international standard IEC 61508 and the Norwegian PDS guide-
lines introduce the aspect Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) for low 
demand systems. Verification of the quantitative part (PFD) of the SIL for a 
safety instrumented function is usually done by a calculation of PFD and 
then by a comparison with the criterion established (Abrahamsen & Røed 
2011). 
The PFD is a central aspect in both methods, and therefore the deduction 
and limitation of the approximate PFD formula is presented in Appendix A.  
The average probability of failure on demand (PFD) is a reliability measure 
which is often used for systems that take actions when a dangerous 
condition is detected (Aven 2006). 
For a more detailed description of the two reliability guidelines, than what is 
given in chapter 3, the reader is referred to the corresponding references. 
3.1 IEC 61508 Method 
The international standard IEC 61508 has been widely accepted as the basis 
for specification, design and operation of SISs (OLF 2004). The standard 
sets out a risk- based approach for deciding the SIL and the standard are 
split into seven parts.   
The approach is complex and has been difficult to handle by the oil and gas 
industry. OLF has therefore made an application of the IEC standards for 
the Norwegian Petroleum Industry (OLF 2004). The overall purpose of OLF 
070 is to issue a guideline on the application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 
and thereby simplify the use of the standards. 
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The performance measures for loss of safety in the IEC 61508 are for low 
demand systems the average probability of failure on demand (PFD). IEC 
61508 then require that SILs for the different safety instrumented functions 
are verified.  
 
The approximate formula for a 1oo1 system for independent failure is 
shown below: 
                      
     
 
 
, were     are dangerous undetected failures (failures per hours), and   the 
test interval in hours.  
Both IEC and PDS give identical approaches when independent failure is 
calculated. 
When common cause failure (CCF) are introduced the PFD for a M-out-of-
N (MooN) system are as followed: 
                    
 
 
 
, were   is the certain fraction of failure for CCF that will cause all the 
redundant components to fail simultaneously or within a short time interval. 
CCF shall only be considered when the analyzed system compromise of 
components which are in a parallel structure. An example of a parallel 
structure is given in chapter 3.4 
If the calculated PFD is higher than the target value (SIL) (Table 2), it 
indicates that risk reducing measures should be implemented. 
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3.1.1 Interpretations in the IEC 61508 guidelines 
The traditional way of accounting for CCF has been the β-factor model in 
IEC 61508. In this model it is assumed that a certain fraction of the failures 
(equal to β) are common cause, i.e. failures that will cause all the redundant 
components to fail simultaneously or within a short time interval.  
If     is the components failure rate, the MooN voted system have a CCF 
contribution equal to β. Hence, this approach does not explicit distinguish 
between different voting logics, and the same result is obtained e.g. for 
1oo2, 1oo5 and 3oo4 voted systems. The simplified example in chapter 3.4 
demonstrates this interpretation.  
Determining values for the β-factor is not a straightforward approach, one 
problem being the limited access to relevant data. Checklists in IEC 61508-
6 (2010) has therefore been developed to support the estimation of this 
parameter. The checklist, or score card as it is referred to in the IEC 61508 
part 6, contains several topics that must be analyzed to determine the β 
factor.  
The IEC 61508 distinguishes between random hardware failure and 
systematic failure. However, systematic failures are not quantified and 
therefore not considered in the PFD calculations. By implementing design 
principles and risk reduction the systematic failure should be avoided and 
therefore not needed to be taken into account.  
IEC 61508 also considers non-perfect testing in part 6, section B.3.2.5 (Ef-
fects of non-perfect proof test) of the final draft version of the 2.0 edition of 
the standard. Here, a Test Coverage (TC) factor is introduced, which is de-
fined as the fraction of dangerous undetected failures that are revealed by a 
functional test.  
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The residual fraction (1-TC) of failures remains unrevealed until a more 
thorough proof test is performed or till the next real demand (Hauge et al. 
2010). When the total PFD of a system is calculated the TC is not consid-
ered (see Figure 3).  
 
3.2 PDS Method 
The Norwegian PDS method is in line with the main principles advocated in 
the IEC 61508 standard, and together with the PDS data (Onshus et al. 
2010) and method handbook (Hauge et al. 2010) it offers an effective and 
practical approach towards implementing the quantitative aspects of the 
standards.  
The PDS method has been applied in numerous projects and in many 
different contexts. The main application, however, has been related to 
computer-based safety systems in the offshore and onshore oil and gas 
industry (Hauge et al. 2010).  
PDS uses a slightly different interpretation and approach when quantify 
failures and for calculating CCF. Failures are categorized according to fail-
ure cause and the PDS standard differentiates between random hardware 
failures and systematic failures, were also the systematic failures is quanti-
fied. PDS introduce in addition a CMooN (see chapter 3.2.1) value when 
CCF is calculated, while IEC only consider the β-factor. 
Note that splitting     (dangerous undetected failure rate) is not necessary 
when performing standard reliability calculations. However, when applica-
tion specific calculations are performed (local safety systems) it is required 
to have an estimate of the fractional split between random hardware failures 
and systematic failures.  
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The potential contributors to loss of safety (safety unavailability) are in PDS 
been split into three main categories: 
- PFD: Unavailability due to dangerous undetected (DU) failures.  
- PTIF: Unavailability due to TIF failures (test independent failures)  
- DTU: Unavailability due to known or planned downtime  
 
In PDS the measure Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) 
3
 is used to quanti-
fy the loss of safety, while the IEC method only consider the PFD when 
quantify the loss of safety.  
 
Thus the relation is as followed: 
CSU = PFD + PTIF 
If the calculated CSU is higher than the target value (SIL) (Table 2), it 
indicates that risk reducing measures should be implemented. 
                                                          
3
 CSU: The probability that the component/system will fail to automatically carry out a 
successful safety action on the occurrence of a hazardous/accidental event, and it is not 
known that the safety system is unavailable (Hauge et al. 2010) 
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3.2.1 Interpretations in the PDS guidelines 
CCF in PDS is based on an extension of the beta factor model in IEC, called 
the multiple beta factor model. The model considers different multiplicities 
of failures and has therefore introduced a configuration factor, CMooN that 
modifies the contribution of CCFs for different voting configurations. This 
means that  βMooN equals: 
 
              
 
These CMooN values suggested by PDS are based on expert judgments 
supported by data related to the effect of adding redundancy to a system. 
These values are regularly updated, last back in 2010, and are presented in 
Appendix B. 
PDS acknowledges that most tests are not 100% perfect and that the SIS, for 
this reason, may not be able to function shortly after a test. Therefore a PTIF 
factor is introduced, which takes into account the probability that certain 
failures are not identified during functional testing.  
The PDS method also introduces a simplified application specific approach 
that should be used when local safety systems are analyzed.  
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3.3 Illustration of differences in safety unavailability 
Figure 3 shows the different contributions to safety unavailability in the IEC 
61508 guidelines (Hauge et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 3.Contribution to safety unavailability in the IEC 61508 method  
Figure 4 shows the different contributions to safety unavailability in the 
PDS guidelines (Hauge et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 4.Contribution to safety unavailability in the PDS method 
The reliability calculations, with use of PDS and IEC 61508 guidelines will 
differ because of different interpretations in the methods.  
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3.4 Simplified example of PFD calculations 
The purpose of this simplified example is to demonstrate how CCF is 
treated in the PDS and IEC 61508 guidelines. Remember that independent 
failures are in the two guidelines calculated by identical approaches, and 
therefore the contributions from those failures are the same in all 
calculations. 
Example: Demonstration of modeling Common Cause Failure 
The subsystem below is the Central Control Console (CCC) from the DSA 
BOP control system. The whole model is presented in chapter 4.2. 
The CCC is a 1oo4 system, with four possible Programmable Logic 
Controller (PLC) signal lines (Figure 5).   
 
 
Figure 5.PLC system (RBD) 
See appendix E for input data. 
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The results and the calculation approaches are shown below: 
                                
 
 
 
       
 
 
         
       
 
                                 
 
 
 
       
 
 
         
       
In this simplified example, the CMooN factor is the only difference between 
the two approaches. The results show that the CMooN notification in the 
PDS method clearly has an impact on the system PFD. 
In this example, the PDS method gives a much lower PFD than the IEC 
61508 method. Actually, the results conclude against different SILs. 
The PDS method concludes with SIL 3, while the IEC conclude with SIL 2. 
For a 1oo4 system the PDS method will always result in a lower PFD than 
with use of the IEC guidelines. The reason is that the PDS introduces a 
CMooN value for voting systems.  In this simplified example a CMooN 
value of 0, 3 (1oo4 system) is used, and by multiplying with 0,3 one will 
achieve a result which is 70 % less then IEC 61508 approach. 
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The outcome presented in the simplified example is not always the scenario, 
because the result in the PDS method depends on the voting of a system.  
Table 3 demonstrates how the CMooN value influence the PFD calculations 
in simple voting systems. 
System 1oo2 1oo3 1oo4 2oo3 2oo4 3oo4 
Corresponding 
CMooN value 
(PDS method) 
1,0 0,5 0,3 2,0 1,1 2,9 
PDS guidelines Same 
PFD 
as IEC 
Lower 
PFD 
than 
IEC 
Lower 
PFD 
IEC 
Higher 
PFD 
than  
IEC 
Higher 
PFD 
than 
IEC 
Higher 
PFD 
than 
IEC 
IEC 61508 
guidelines 
Same 
PFD 
as 
PDS 
Higher 
PFD 
than 
PDS 
Higher 
PFD 
than 
PDS 
Lower 
PFD 
than 
PDS 
Lower 
PFD 
than 
PDS 
Lower 
PFD 
than 
PDS 
Table 3.PFD results with different voting system 
 
If the CMooN value is higher than 1, the PDS guidelines will result in a 
higher PFD than with use of IEC 61508 guidelines. While if CMooN is 
lower than 1, PDS will result in a lower PFD than with use of IEC 61508. 
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4.0 Presentation of the case study - DSA BOP control 
system 
This chapter includes some background information of the BOP control 
system on DSA and a RBD which are used in the reliability calculations.  
See Bai (2010) for general information about a piloted hydraulic BOP 
control system, and Appendix C for a short description of the DSA 
platform. 
4.1 System description of the BOP control system 
The new and modified BOP control system on DSA is a Piloted Hydraulic 
Control System (OD&T 2010). The previous BOP control system was oper-
ated through a Multiplex (MUX) control system, which also was installed 
on DWH. 
The principal function of the surface control system is to control and moni-
tor the hydraulically operated subsea equipment. This surface control sys-
tem controls both the main hydraulic pressure, as well as the hydraulic pilot 
signals. The hydraulic power for the system is supplied from a Hydraulic 
Power Unit (HPU) and associated accumulator bottle racks. All BOP func-
tions can be controlled and monitored from either the Driller’s or Tool 
pusher’s panels (OD&T 2010).  
Signals are sent from the Drill Floor Panel and Tool Pusher Panel to the 
CCC PLC’s, where they are processed according to a predetermined set of 
logic instructions (OD&T 2010). Then the corresponding signals are trans-
mitted to the Surface Electronics Panel (SEP) and initiates control signals to 
the hydraulic panel. Pressure switch inputs from the hydraulic panel confirm 
valve movements in response to control commands. The Hydraulic Control 
Module (solenoids) then gives pressure to two redundant umbilicals, which 
again transport pressure too respectively a yellow or a blue pod. The pod 
then gives pressure further to the BOP stack (OD&T 2010). 
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4.2 Case model- Reliability block diagram of the BOP control 
system 
The BOP control system on Deepsea Atlantic will be used as a case example 
in the reliability analysis, and for this purpose a Reliability Block Diagram 
(RBD) is made and presented (Figure 6). 
For those who are not familiar with RBD, a Fault Tree is constructed for the 
same system and could be found in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 6.RBD of the BOP control system on DSA 
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In the process of making the model (interpretation of a real phenomena), a 
lot of work has been done to make the model as realistic as possible. But 
still, the model must not be taken as a blueprint of the DSA BOP control 
system.  
Model uncertainty is a topic that is given a lot of attention in the literature of 
reliability and risk analysis (Aven & Nilsen 2002) (Zio & Apostolakis 1996) 
(Chatfield 1995) (Lundteigen 2009). It seems like an overall understanding 
of what model uncertainty is and how this influences the quantitative results 
does not exist.  
 
The RBD used in the calculation is not uncertain; it is only a simplified 
phenomenon of the DSA BOP control system, but if the model is changed, 
the result will differ.  
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5.0 Results  
In this chapter the results from the reliability study, by use of IEC 61508 
and PDS guidelines will be presented.  
The input data used in the calculations are mainly based on information 
from OREDA (OREDA 2009), PDS method Handbook (Hauge et al.2010), 
PDS data handbook (Onshus et al. 2010) and a SINTEF reliability study 
(Holand 1999).  
An overview of input data used in the calculations can be found in Appen-
dix E. 
Several methods exist to verify an underlying lifetime distribution. Hazard 
plotting or Nelson estimator is a graphic method to identify the underlying 
lifetime distribution (Aven 2006). 
Example: Verifying the underlying distributions 
The input data used in the Hazard plotting is based on Mean Time To 
Failure (MTTF) values. The result from the Hazard plotting is presented in 
Appendix F and shows the plots fall roughly on a straight line, which 
indicates that the hazard line is linear. Based on this information one can 
conclude that the failure rate is approximate constant and that exponential 
distribution is a preferable distribution to assume.  
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5.1 SIL verification on the NCS 
First of all, data from the Risk Level Project (RNNP 2010) on the NCS has 
been reviewed for the function "BOP isolation". The RNNP was initiated in 
1999/2000 to develop and utilize a measuring tool which illustrates the de-
velopment in the risk level on the NCS.  
Based on the data collected from RNNP (PTIL 2010) the PFD has been cal-
culated
4
 to be 7.42E-03, which indicates a SIL 2 requirement for closing one 
valve in the BOP stack on the NCS.   
5.2 Reliability analysis of the DSA BOP control system 
In the calculations the approximate formulas given in PDS and IEC 61508 
are used. The results from the reliability calculation are presented in the 
Table 4.  
 
Deepsea Atlantic BOP Control System 
Reliability guidelines Result, PFD system 
(hours) 
SIL level 
IEC 61508 guidelines 
(approximate formulas) 
        SIL 2 
PDS guidelines (ap-
proximate formulas) 
        SIL 2 
PDS guidelines – Ap-
plication specific calcu-
lations 
        SIL 3 
Table 4.PDS and IEC results 
The result shows that the BOP control system on DSA is within SIL 2 given 
by OLF 070 (2004). 
                                                          
4
 In this exact scenario (1oo1) the IEC 61508 and PDS guidelines are identical 
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6.0 Discussion 
6.1 Reliability analysis of the DSA BOP control system 
It is important to note that there is little relevant research published on relia-
bility of a BOP control system, both in Norway and worldwide. Reliability 
assessment of offshore systems is often classified as restricted or internal 
information by the oil and gas companies. This is a problem when perform-
ing reliability studies, simply because these studies depend on having rele-
vant input data available.  
The BOP control system on DWH was one of the safety critical systems that 
failed and significantly contributed to escalate the accident (BP 2010). 
Therefore it is reasonable to believe that more studies and research will be 
prioritized in the years to come.  
SINTEF has some relevant studies, mainly a joint industry project on behalf 
of the Minerals Management Services, which was conducted on data from 
the GOM (Holand 1999)(Holand & Skalle 2001). Scandpower also has 
some relevant research, and they recently initiated a new research project on 
the reliability of a BOP (Scandpower 2011). 
The result in chapter 5.2 shows that the DSA BOP control system is within 
the SIL requirements given by OLF 070. The results are also in agreement 
with the calculated PFD based on data from PTIL RNNP (Chapter 5.1). 
By use of IEC 61508 guidelines one achieved a higher system PFD than 
with use of PDS guidelines. The difference cannot be categorist as critical, 
simply because both methods conclude within the same SIL. In this exact 
model the PDS method give approximately 0,3 % lower PFD than with use 
of IEC guidelines. 
In the simplified example presented in chapter 3.4 the results were more 
dramatic. Actually, the results concluded against different SIL. PDS 
concluded with SIL 3, while the IEC 61508 concluded with SIL 2.   
 41 
 
 
 
An application specific 
5
calculation of the BOP control system based on 
PDS guidelines has also been performed. The result from those calculations 
differs strongly from the other calculations presented in chapter 5.2. With 
use of the application specific calculation one will probably, in most 
scenarios, archive a lower PFD. The main reason is that generic failure rate 
is often higher than vendor data. In an application specific calculation of 
local safety system, the vendor data shall be used, if not, generic data should 
be modified to vendor data.  
6.1.1 Assumptions and limitation in the PFD formula 
The PFD formulas are based on the assumption that the lifetime of failure 
rates is exponentially distributed (see also proof in Appendix A). Thus, the 
exponential distribution is characterized by a constant failure rate.  A unit 
having an exponential failure time distribution has a tendency to failure that 
does not depend on the age of the unit (Aven 2006).  Other assumptions in 
the underlying distribution is that after a test the system is assumed to be as 
good as new and that the state of the system can only be identified by a test 
or a demand. If decision makers are not aware of the assumptions and condi-
tions attended with the PFD formula, they may misinterpret the results.  
An issue that is sometimes raised is whether to use the average or time de-
pendent PFD. Some researchers argue that the average PFD is misleading 
since the PFD in approximately 50% of the time is higher than this value 
(Dutuit et al. 2008).  
Currently, the IEC 61508 and the PDS method suggest using the average 
PFD, while a new ISO Technical Report (TR) (to be released 2012/2013), 
will recommend to use the time dependent PFD (ISO TR 12489). 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Local safety systems or specific systems 
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Example: Underlying distribution in the PFD formula 
You are given a choice to select between two identical light bulbs. Light 
bulb A have been in use for 5 months and light bulb B have been in use only 
for a couple of days. Then it is reasonable to think that most of us would 
choose light bulb B. Simply, because light bulb B is newer and probably will 
work for a longer period. Based on the information of exponential distribu-
tion the choice is not light bulb B, because the tendency of failure do not 
depend on the age of the unit. 
The probability that the light bulb then will survive an additional “v” hours 
is given by (Aven 2006): 
 
              
            
      
 
        
      
 
          
    
               
 
The exponential distribution is the only distribution with this property, and 
this lack of memory simplifies the mathematical modeling. 
The fact that the failure rate is constant for large values of “T” may seem 
unrealistic in the example above. However, remember that usually the inter-
est is on studying the lifetime in a limited period of time. The failure rate 
assumed outside this period will then not be critical (Aven 2008).  
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6.2 Different interpretation in the IEC and PDS method 
This section aims to demonstrate that with use of the different reliability 
guidelines (PDS and IEC 61508) the PFD and conclusion against SIL can 
differ. 
Topics that will be focused on are: 
- β  modeling 
- Hardware and Systematic failure 
- Application specific calculations 
- Calculation approaches (detailed or approximate formulas) 
- Input data 
 
The traditional approach (IEC and PDS) for verification of a quantitative 
SIL seems intuitively appealing. As Figure 7 shows, firstly, a SIL 
requirement for the probability of failure on demand is given. Then the 
probability of failure on demand is calculated for the specific system, before 
it is compared with the established criteria.  
If the calculated PFD is higher than the target value (SIL), it indicates that 
risk reducing measures should be implemented. If the calculated PFD is 
lower or equal the SIL requirement the system is approved. 
 
Figure 7.Traditional approach 
1. Risk 
acceptance 
criteria (SIL) 
2. Probability 
calculations 
(IEC 61508 or 
PDS guidlines) 
3. SIL 
verification 
4. Conclusion 
or risk 
reduction 
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Both methods are based on probability calculations when SIL requirement is 
verified. By jumping directly into probabilities, important uncertainty as-
pects are easily truncated, meaning that potential surprises could be left un-
considered (Aven, 2008).        
Uncertainties are often hidden in the background knowledge, and restricting 
attention to the assigned probabilities could camouflage factors that could 
produce surprising outcomes (Aven 2008). Therefore researchers argue that 
it is important to look beyond the assigned probabilities (Aven 2010) (Abra-
hamsen & Røed 2011) (Flage & Aven 2009).  
 
The point is that probability is a tool to express uncertainty. It is, however, 
not a perfect tool, and therefore verification against SIL should not only be 
based on the probabilistic world (Abrahamsen & Røed 2011). The probabil-
ities (P) are conditional on specific background knowledge (K), and they 
could produce poor predictions (                      ) (Abrahamsen 
& Røed 2011). 
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6.2.1 Beta modeling 
The differences between the standard β-factor model in IEC 61508 and PDS 
are illustrated in Figure 8.  
A circle (say A) represents the event of component A has failed. For a du-
plicated set of redundant components A and B (N=2), the standard IEC 
61508 and PDS approach are identical for CCF calculations; Here, β repre-
sents the fraction of failures affecting both A and B, so that they fail simul-
taneously  (Hauge et al. 2010).  
For a triplicate set of components (N=3), the β-factor model in IEC 61508, 
assumes that whenever there is a failure affecting two components (say A 
and B) the third component (C) will also fail. According to PDS it will nev-
er happen that just two of the three components fail due to a CCF (Hauge et 
al. 2010). Using the PDS method and the updated CMooN factors, it is as-
sumed that if A and B have failed due to a CCF, C may also fail (50% of the 
cases)   (Hauge et al. 2010). 
 
 
Figure 8.Illustration of differences in Β model in IEC 61508 and PDS 2010 
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From Figure 8 it is also seen that the C2oo3 factor in the PDS method 2010 
becomes 2.0, since the fraction of failures affecting 2 or 3 component is 
0.5∙β + 0.5∙β + 0.5∙β + 0.5∙β = 2.0∙β. 
In the 2006 edition of PDS method handbook, the CMooN values were 
slightly different.  Using the PDS method 2006 it was assumed that if A and 
B have failed due to a CCF, C may also fail, but only in 30% of the situa-
tions. Based on this information the old PDS 2006 C2oo3 factor would be; 
0.3∙β + 0.7∙β + 0.7∙β + 0.7∙β = 2.4∙β.  
 
Example: Calculation of PFD with use of “old” and “new” CMooN factor 
given by PDS 
Think of the simplified example in chapter 3.4. In those calculations the new 
CMooN values found in the PDS method handbook 2010 were used. 
In this example the same system is analyzed, but instead of using CMooN of 
0, 3 (as suggested in PDS 2010) a CMooN value of 0, 15 is used instead (as 
suggested in PDS 2006).  
The system PFD in the simplified example is then calculated to be approxi-
mately 2.36 E-0.4. The PFD becomes slightly lower, but one can argue that 
the change is not very dramatic because both calculations conclude against 
the same SIL. If the example were more complex, the outcome could be 
greater and then the conclusion against SIL could differ.  
Note that there is a new committee draft version of IEC 61508-6 (2010) that 
includes correction factors for modifying the β-factor for different MooN 
voting configurations. This approach is in line with the β model approach in 
PDS, even if some of the modification factors proposed by IEC deviate 
slightly from the suggested values in PDS.  
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6.2.2 Hardware and Systematic failure 
In the PDS – project “Reliability Quantification of Computer-Based Safety 
Systems” it was documented that systematic failure is a major contributor 
towards unavailability of safety functions (Aarø 1997). 
Because of this contribution OLF 070 recommends to use PDS guidelines 
when carrying out application specific calculations (See also chapter 6.2.3).  
 
Example: Taking systematic failures into account - PDS 
Again the simplified example in chapter 3.4 will be used. In this example to 
demonstrate how the systematic failure influences the total PFD calcula-
tions. The dangerous undetected failures have to be split
6
 into systematic 
and random hardware failure. 
When taking into account the split of dangerous undetected failures, the 
system PFD becomes 3.32 E-04. In this example the systematic failure has 
an impact on the PFD. The outcome in this example is that the PFD be-
comes slightly higher. If the example were more complex, the outcome 
could be greater and then the conclusion against SIL could differ. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 In this specific example an r value of 0, 3 are chosen (Hauge et al. 2010). The “r” is the 
fraction of     originating from random hardware failures. See Lundteiegn (2010) for a 
more detailed description. 
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6.2.3 Application specific calculations 
For a given application of SIS, the appropriate data to use may deviate from 
the average data presented in handbooks or databases. PDS has therefore 
developed simple models in order to adapt or transform average parameter 
values into application specific values.  
 
Example: Expert judgments in the application specific calculations - PDS 
When performing application specific calculation by use of PDS, the 
parameters                      need to be treated and modified to local 
safety conditions. To support expert deal with the process, the PDS method 
presents guidelines that can support under the process. 
This approach can result in a lower or higher PFD, depending on how the 
guidelines are judged. It is reasonable to think that this approach will lead 
to a lower PFD, since the experts on its own system can or might have a 
tendency to overprotect the system they are working on daily. 
 
The IEC standard gives an opportunity to carry out application specific cal-
culations. Determining these β values (upgraded) is not a straightforward 
approach when following IEC guidelines. Therefore the main part of relia-
bility researches uses the application specific approach presented by PDS. 
One problem being the lack of input data, relevance of the input data and the 
subjective or expert judgments in the scorecard 
7
approach.  
The scorecard consists of a number of questions that needs to be answered, 
and at the end these answer are summarized to a total score, which is the β 
that should be used when dealing with CCF. 
                                                          
7
 The scorecard in the IEC method can be found in IEC 61508 –part 6 – table D.1 (IEC 
61508-6 2010) 
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A general weakness related to application specific calculations, both in IEC 
and PDS, is expert and human judgments. The result of this calculation 
approach is believed to differ strongly, depending on how well the 
reliability analyst knows the analyzed system. Therefore it is preferable that 
this application is performed in collaboration with technical experts. Still, 
expert judgments also have a tendency to vary. 
Example: Variation in expert judgments  
In Baraldi et al. (2009) five organizations with significant experience in 
explosion modeling performed numerical simulations of explosions in a spe-
cific tunnel. The expert judgments are in this scenario used as input data 
and to select the wanted approach in a Computational Fluid Dynamics 
(CFD) simulation.  
The result shows that there was a significant difference in the conclusion. 
The selected approach, based on the expert judgments, was believed to be 
one criterion that influenced the overall conclusion. 
 
 50 
 
6.2.4 Calculation approach 
In the reliability calculations (Chapter 5) the approximate formulas in the 
IEC 61508 and PDS method have been used.  
The PDS guidelines give an opportunity to calculate the PFD with use of 
“more detailed formulas” (Hauge et al. 2010). According to Lunteigen 
(2009) the difference between the calculation approaches is not dramatic. 
The PFD may also be calculated by using mathematically exact expressions 
(Markov modeling) (Høyland and Rausand 2004). Hauge et al. (2010) has 
carried out calculations with Markov for different voting system and com-
pared the results with the approximate formulas in IEC 61508 and PDS. As 
expected, because of different interpretations, the results differ. For simpli-
fied models, the result is in reasonable agreement, but for complex systems 
the difference is greater. 
In the example below (Figure 9) the PFD will be calculated for a 1oo3 Hy-
draulic Control Manifold system to determine the difference between ap-
proximate and “more detailed” formulas given by PDS. The system can be 
characterized as a 1oo3 and input data can be found in Appendix E. 
 
Figure 9.Hydraulic Control Manifold (RBD) 
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Example: Comparison of the approximate and more detailed formulas 
given by the PDS method 
In this specific example the PDS approximate and PDS “more detailed” 
(not Markov modeling) formulas gives the same result. 
To be precise, the PDS approximation formulas give a PFD of 1, 7520E-04, 
while the more detailed formulas give a PFD of 1, 7525E-04. 
 If the example were more complex the outcome could be greater.  
 
It is important to note that the ISO TR 12489 includes new approaches and 
guidelines on how reliability analysis should be handled by the industry. 
The TR argues in some extent that for complex systems, the guidelines and 
approaches in PDS and IEC 61508 is not sufficient.   
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6.2.5 Input Data 
All data sources used in this thesis are seen as credible data by the oil and 
gas industry. The best practice would probably be to use one data source, 
but in many situations, this is not possible because of lack of relevant input 
data. 
The input data could be poor or less representative due to factors such as 
(Hauge et al. 2010): 

- The data collection itself; inadequate failure reporting, classification 
or data interpretation.  
- Variations between installations; the failure rates are highly depend-
ent upon the operating conditions and also the equipment will vary 
between installations.  
- Relevance of data / equipment boundaries; what components are in-
cluded / not included in the reported data? Have equipment parts 
been repaired or simply replaced?  
- Assumed statistical model; is the standard assumption of a constant 
failure rate always relevant for the equipment type under considera-
tion?  
- Aggregated operational experience; what is the total amount of op-
erational experience underlying the given estimates?  
 
The data sources presented in data bases are based on generic values. A ge-
neric failure rate is believed to be higher than vendor data, and will therefore 
result, in many cases, in a higher PFD result. 
If the system that is being analyzed is based on new technology, the generic 
data could produce poor and unrealistic result. The reason is that generic 
data does not exist for new technology due to lack of field experience. 
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The vendor data is often collected from newer technology, but vendor data 
can also been collected during laboratory testing or limited field experience 
only. If so, important factors like human involvement, field environment, 
etc. are not reflected and may thus underestimate the failure rate (Janbu 
2009).  
Figure 10 illustrates in a simplified manner the compromise between the 
need for failure data and the relevance of the data (Lundteigen 2010). The 
broader the category of failure data becomes, the less representative the data 
can be for a particular component.  
 
Figure 10.Illustration of availability and relevance of failure data 
 
Example: Use of sensitivity study in the input data  
In a sensitivity study presented by Janbu (2009,) two different failure rates 
(generic) for “level transmitter” resulted in significant differences between 
the estimated unavailability. The generic data which was used in the calcu-
lations were based on the exact same equipment, but was gathered from 
difference sources. In this exact study the data was gathered from OLF 070 
and OREDA.  
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6.3 An overview and a summary of factors which influences the 
PFD result 
 
Figure 11 aims to illustrate parameters that can influence the PFD calcula-
tions, and again can cause or mislead to wrong interpretation of the results.  
 
Figure 11. Factors which can influence the PFD result 
 
The main factor is identified to be calculation approach, input data, reliabil-
ity guidelines and expert judgments. 
PFD 
result 
Calculation 
Approach 
- Approximate or 
more detailed 
formulas 
- Markov  
modeling 
Input Data 
(failure rate) 
- Generic data 
- Vendor data 
Reliability 
Guidlines 
- IEC 61508 
- PDS 
- New ISO 
technical report 
Expert Judgments 
- Expert judgments 
have a tendency to 
vary and this can 
influence the PFD 
result 
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Lunteigen (2009) presents a similar overview and with underlying factors as 
well, but with slightly different main factors. These underlying factors can 
for example be time pressure, competence, regulations, standards and guide-
lines (Lundteigen 2009).  
The reliability guidelines (IEC 61508 and PDS) are not defined as an under-
lying factor in Figure 11, as it is by Lundteigen (2009). The reason for this 
is that with use of different reliability guidelines one will achieve different 
system PFD for the same model, especially when a model is built up by dif-
ferent voting configuration. When making decisions it is important to have 
some background knowledge of how different reliability guidelines can in-
fluence the PFD.  
Therefore, I argue that reliability guidelines are not an underlying factor, but 
a main factor.  
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7.0 Idea for an approach to support the verification of 
SIL 
This chapter includes a presentation of new ideas for a method which aims 
to support decision makers after the PFD of the system is calculated and 
before SIL is verified. The presentation of the new method is given in chap-
ter 7.1. An example in chapter 7.2 will then be presented to demonstrate the 
ideas in a practical example.  
Chapter 7.3 includes a discussion of weaknesses and strengths associated 
with the new ideas and existing approaches. 
 
It is important to note that the method presented in this chapter is not a new 
approach, but it includes some new ideas of how one can merge existing 
approaches to help decision makers when SIL is verified. 
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7.1 Overview of the method 
An overview of the method is shown in the block diagram below (Figure 
12). The method can be described as a semi quantitative/qualitative ap-
proach.  
 
Figure 12.New idea of an approach to verify against SIL 
 
The only new idea in the method is the use of a quantitative sensitivity anal-
ysis in Step 2. 
7.1.1 Step 1: Reliability calculations 
Step 1 consists of PFD calculation with use of IEC 61508 or PDS 
guidelines. 
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7.1.2 Step 2: Quantitative sensitivity study of the failure rate 
Step 2 consists of a quantitative sensitivity study, which aim to find out how 
robust the system is against changes in the input data (λ).  
I also identified the failure rate (Chapter 6.3) as a critical factor that will 
influence the PFD result.  
The step is not in total agreement with the ACP perspective described in 
chapter 2.1.1, but the goal in the step is not to describe uncertainty in the 
failure rate. The goal is to conclude against robustness in the system. 
The lower and upper limits of the estimated λ may be presented as a 90 % 
confidence interval (OREDA 2009). This is an interval (λL, λU), such that 
the “true value” of λ fulfils (OREDA 2009): 
P(λL ≤ λ < λU) = 90% 
With n failures during an aggregated time in service ( ) this 90% confidence 
interval is given by: 
(
 
  
Z0,95,2n,
 
  
Z0,05,2(n+1)) 
,were Z0,95,ν  and Z0,05,ν  denote the upper 95% and 5% percentiles, 
respectively, of the    distribution with “ν” degrees of freedom. See 
Appendix G for percentage point for the CHI- square distribution. 
Guidelines in step 2  
The quantitative sensitivity study can conclude with two different outcomes: 
- Low robustness: The different failure rates (Low and High) used in the 
PFD calculations conclude against DIFFERENT SIL. 
- High robustness: The different failure rates (Low and High) used in the 
PFD calculations do conclude against the SAME SIL. 
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7.1.3 Step 3: Qualitatively uncertainty workshop 
The ideas for Step 3 are adopted from Abrahamsen & Røed (2011). 
Abrahamsen & Røed (2011) presents and discuss an alternative approach, 
acknowledging that the calculated probability should not be the only basis 
for verifying the established quantitative SIL requirements. 
The approach consists of identifying sub-categories, from a human, tech-
nical and operational perspective (MTO). Then each sub-category is evalu-
ated with respect to uncertainty and based on this evaluation the category is 
given an uncertainty classification. The uncertainty classifications are based 
on guidelines from Flage & Aven (2009). 
 
Guidelines in step 3 
The qualitatively workshop can conclude with low, medium or high uncer-
tainty. This conclusion is based on subjective and expert judgments. 
 
7.1.4 Step 4: Overall judgment 
This step consist of an overall judgment were step 2 and 3 shall be seen in 
relation with step 1.  
Guidelines in step 4 
A general guideline for the overall judgment are made and described below: 
-  High robustness and low uncertainty  Conclude against SIL.  
To simplify the verification against SIL, only one guideline is made. For all 
other outcomes risk reducing measures are needed before concluding. 
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7.2 Demonstration of the method with an example 
The example that will be used to demonstrate the new method is based on 
failure data given by Holand (1999) on the GOM. The system that will be 
treated separately is a hydraulic pod
8
 and is in this case seen as a 1oo1 sys-
tem (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13.POD system (RBD) 
 
7.2.1. Step 1 
The PFD is calculated with use of IEC 61509 and PDS guidelines.  
                               
 
Step 1 concludes against SIL 0. 
 
                                                          
8
 Note that this pod system is not comparable with the hydraulic pod system on DSA 
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7.2.2. Step 2 
Based on the method given in chapter 7.1.2 the following confidence inter-
vals are calculated: 
                                    
                                     
 
The PFD for the 1oo1 pod system is then calculated by use of lower and 
higher failure rate to determine how this influences the system PFD.  
 
                                          
                                           
 
Step 2 concludes with low robustness, because low and high failure rate 
conclude against different SILs. 
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7.2.3. Step 3 
The MTO uncertainty workshop is presented in Table 5. 
 
Uncertainty workshop: Pod system 
MTO 
perspective 
Sub- categories Evaluation Uncertainty 
classification 
Human 
aspects (M) 
Training Operators will be 
trained to recog-
nize situations 
that need manual 
push down from 
panels 
Medium 
Technical 
aspects (T) 
Hydraulic pres-
sure in pod 
Test interval and 
maintenance is 
required but not 
always followed 
Low 
Operational 
aspects (O) 
Procedures Poor quality 
management 
Low 
Table 5.Uncertainty Workshop 
Based on a subjective judgment in collaboration with a technical expert, 
step 3 concludes with low uncertainty. 
 
7.2.4 Step 4 
This step is based on guidelines presented in chapter 7.1.4, were step 2 and 
3 are seen in relation with step 1. 
 
Steps 4 conclude that risk reducing measures are needed before verifying 
against SIL. 
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7.3 Strengths and weaknesses with new ideas and existing 
approaches 
In this section I will both argue for and against the new ideas in the 
suggested approach and existing approaches.  
It is important to note that there is a need for new ideas and approaches 
when verifying PFD against SIL. No overall agreement or guidelines exist 
to support decision makers when concluding against SIL. 
 
7.3.1 Quantitative sensitivity study of the failure rate 
To determine if a system have low or high robust, I argue that a quantify 
sensitivity study (step 2) is a good approach to use. This approach can be 
used to test the robustness and to determine how the failure rates influence 
the system PFD. It can also help to draw attention to those factors that re-
quires especially careful assessment or management (New Zealand Treasury 
2005). As mention earlier in this thesis, sensitivity analysis is given a lot of 
attention in nuclear power industry, while in the oil and gas industry the 
topic is often neglected.  
The strength with implementing sensitivity studies in reliability guidelines 
(IEC 61508 and PDS) is that the input data (failure rate) will be given more 
attention. A PFD calculation, based on IEC and PDS guidelines, is mainly 
influenced by the input data.  The failure rate was also a critical factor 
which I identified in chapter 6.3. Sensitivity studies are used as a powerful 
tool by economics to predict and highlight uncertainty to future cash flows 
in cost - benefit analysis.   
By carrying out a quantify sensitivity study which aim to describe the ro-
bustness of a system, is therefore information that can be used to support 
decision makers. 
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Researches will and can probably in some extent argue that Step 2: 
- do not take the MTO perspective into fully account 
- that uncertainty from a ACP perspective is not given enough atten-
tion  
- that sensitivity studies is time and cost consuming 
- that sensitivity is already covered in the uncertainty workshop in 
step 3 (will be discussed in chapter 7.3.2) 
 
I also believe that the MTO perspective must be taking more into account 
when performing sensitivity studies (Step 2), especially for technical sys-
tems that are manually activated (BOP, ESD).  In some data, for example, 
historical failure rate, one can argue that the MTO perspective is more or 
less covered. Those failure rates have been influences by human errors and 
organizational failure over time. For other data, as for example, vendor data, 
the MTO is not covered in a preferable way in step 2. Simply because this 
input data is mainly based on new technology. 
I agree that uncertainty from an ACP perspective is not given enough atten-
tion in step 2, but from a relative frequencies perspective, the uncertainty is 
covered by the sensitivity study. The goal in the step is not to describe un-
certainty in the failure rate, but instead to conclude against robustness of the 
analyzed system. Robustness as a decision tool is frequently discussed in 
risk and reliability research. Barberies (2006) also argue that a quantify sen-
sitivity analysis is a powerful and useful tool to support decision making 
processes. 
Sensitivity studies can be time and cost consuming, especially when the 
analyzed system is complex. Therefore it can be practical to select a subsys-
tem in a model which is seen as critical. A number of importance ranking 
measures have been developed to support sensitivity analyses, for example 
Birnbaum’s and the Improvement potential measure (Lundteigen 2009).  
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These measures can be used in collaboration with the sensitivity study. 
Sometimes the relative reliability between components is a more important 
knowledge than the overall reliability itself since it might pinpoint vulnera-
bilities in the system that needs to be addressed (NASA 2011). 
7.3.2 Qualitatively uncertainty workshop 
In step 3 I adopted the uncertainty workshop presented by Abrahamsen & 
Røed (2011), while the uncertainty classification used in the approach is 
gathered from Flage & Aven (2009). The MTO perspective is well imple-
mented in the approach and I believe that human involvement and organiza-
tional factor will be more covered than in a standard quantify approach. 
I identified two weaknesses in Abrahamsen & Røed (2011) approach that 
need to be more addressed in reliability research: 
- uncertainty categorizing of the sub categories (see table 5)  
- a need to highlight and clarify the use of sensitivity 
The uncertainty categorizing of the subsystems is preferred in collaboration 
with technical expert on the analyzed system. This is because the reliability 
experts, in many cases do not have the preferable knowledge of a compli-
cated technical system. It is reasonable to think that the uncertainty work-
shop will more often conclude with low uncertainty instead of high uncer-
tainty. The reason might be that some technical expert might have a tenden-
cy to overprotect the system they are working with daily. If this is the most 
likely outcome, the output from the suggested approach by Abrahamsen & 
Røed (2011) can lose some of its value. 
Another point is that expert judgments also have a tendency to vary due to 
different background knowledge and experience. This is not reflected well 
enough in the suggested approach. This can lead to that the same analyzed 
system can result in two different results, if it is studied by two independent 
reliability experts.  
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One expert can for example conclude with low uncertainty, while another 
can conclude with high uncertainty. If the result then is seen is relation with 
the probabilities, the overall judgment will probably lead to a different con-
clusion. Again, if this is the most likely outcome, the output from the ap-
proach by Abrahamsen & Røed (2011) can lose some of its value. 
Abrahamsen & Røed (2011) also take sensitivity into account (qualitative), 
where the sensitivity is seen in relation to uncertainty and assigned probabil-
ities.  My opinion is that sensitivity is not well documented or highlighted in 
the approach. Therefore, I also argue that the approach suggested by Abra-
hamsen & Røed (2011) in some extent lack the focus on sensitivity.  
It is important to be aware of the limitations which is highlighted above, if 
not, the results can be misunderstood and the output from the approach can 
lose some of its value as a decision tool. Several misunderstandings can then 
lead to poor decision making, which again can cause to an incorrect 
conclusion against SIL. 
I acknowledge that the quantitative sensitivity (step 2) and the approach 
suggested by Abrahamsen & Røed (2011) (step 3) is in some extent in re-
semble agreement.  
The only difference is that I will introduce a quantitative sensitivity study 
which aim to conclude against robustness. In addition, I implemented the 
approach suggested by Abrahamsen & Røed (2011).  
How these two steps can influence each other in the suggested approach 
(chapter 7.1) is not considered in a detailed way.  
It is reasonable to think that my idea for an approach will in some extent 
consider the sensitivity of the failure rate two times, both in step 2 and in the 
implemented step 3. The outcome and the consequences of this scenario are 
not clear and must be addressed more in reliability research.  
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8.0 Further work 
The PFD calculations give a useful insight for decision makers. After 
presenting several examples of how different interpretations in the methods 
result in different SIL verification, I argue that there is need for a broader 
reflection of robustness and uncertainties that can support decision makers. 
The reason for this is that both methods are based on probability 
calculations when SIL is verified or determined.  
In the oil and gas industry it is common to define and describe risk using 
probabilities and probability distributions. This can and has probably led to 
misunderstandings and some misleading interpretation of the result in relia-
bility analysis. This is a topic I believe must be more addressed in risk and 
reliability research. 
I strongly believe that the MTO perspective must be more reflected in relia-
bility assessments. This is a topic that has now been more or less imple-
mented in risk analysis and accident investigation. Therefore it is reasonable 
to think that the perspective will be more addressed in future reliability as-
sessments. More research is needed on the topic and on how the perspective 
can be implemented in reliability analysis.  
As previously mentioned, reliability assessments is often classified as re-
stricted information by the oil and gas companies. The consequences of this 
are that relevant experience is not transferred between companies. There-
fore, I argue that there is a need for more collaboration between companies 
working on safety critical systems. 
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To get an overview of some of the most important findings in this thesis, 
Figure 14 is presented.  
 
 
Figure 14. Main findings 
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9.0 Conclusion 
The four goals which were stated in chapter 1.2 is concluded against below. 
1. Highlight with examples that with use of IEC 61508 and PDS 
method the result can differ, and that this can lead to different 
conclusion based on SIL verifying. 
The calculations in chapter 3.4 are one example that shows the PFD results 
differ strongly and that the guidelines conclude against different SIL for the 
same system.  
2. Determine if the BOP control system on DSA is within SIL 
requirements given by OLF 070. 
The calculations in this thesis (chapter 5) show that the BOP control system 
on DSA is within SIL 2 given by OLF. 
3. Identify factors that influence the PFD calculation in the 
reliability guidelines. 
The most critical factor which can influence the PFD result is identified to 
be: Calculation approaches (approximate vs. detailed formulas), Input data 
(vendor vs. generic data), Expert judgments (they have a tendency to vary) 
and the use of different reliability guidelines (IEC 61508 vs. PDS). 
4. Develop new ideas to an approach that aim to support decision 
making when SIL is verified against the requirements. 
I present some ideas on how one can merge existing approaches to support 
decision making, and I argue that it is important to look beyond assigned 
probabilities when SIL is verified. I believe that this is a topic that must be 
more addressed in risk and reliability research, because no overall agree-
ment or guidelines to support decision makers when concluding against SIL 
exists. 
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11.0 Appendix list 
Appendix A. Deduction of the approximate formula for 
PFDavg/ MFDT 
 
The average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg /MFDT) is 
mathematically expressed by (Abrahamsen 2011): 
        
       
 
 
 
 
The following assumption applies (Abrahamsen 2011): 
- The components are put in operation at time t = 0 
- The state of the system can only be identified at a test or at a demand 
- The system is tested and if necessary repaired after regular time in-
tervals of length   
- After a test or a repair the system is assumed to be as good as new 
- The time required to test and repair the item is considered to be neg-
ligible 
The average unavailability is the mean proportion of time the system is not 
function. That is why PFDavg sometimes is called the mean fractional dead 
time (MFDT). 
The unavailability at time t,      , denotes the probability that a system will 
fail to respond adequately to the demand at time t. 
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In most applications we are not interested in the PFD as a function of time. 
It is sufficient to know the long run average value of PFD (PFDavg). 
Because of the periodicity of      , the long run average PFD is equal to the 
average value of      in the first test interval        
In the PFD calculation the exponential distribution is assumed: 
            
    
 
   
              
    
, when                                       
 
   
 
, then the proof is as followed (Abrahamsen 2011): 
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Appendix B. Voting factors - PDS 
 
The PDS CMooN 2010 values are given in the table below. 
 
Voting 1oo2 1oo3 2oo3 1oo4 2oo4 3oo4 
      1.0 0.5 2.0 0.3 1.1 2.9 
 
 
There also exist other sources for data on CMooN factors. The Swedish 
nuclear power inspectorate has through several reports investigated CCF. 
These values are in reasonable agreement with the PDS and IEC 61508 draft 
values, but in some voting configuration there is a major difference.  
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Appendix C. Deepsea Atlantic Platform 
 
Deepsea Atlantic is a sixth generation deepwater and harsh environment 
semisubmersible (OD&T 2009). This unit, along with its sister platform 
Deepsea Stavanger, is a state of the art dual derrick, dynamic-positioned 
unit of enhanced GVA 7500 design. Deepsea Atlantic is designed for 
operations in water depths up to 3000 meters.  
Daevoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) are responsible for 
the engineering of the rig systems and the construction of the rig. (OD&T 
2009). 
See Figures below for a side view and real live picture of the rig. 
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Appendix D. Fault Tree of the BOP control system model on 
DSA 
 
The fault Tree is constructed with use of CARA. 
 
 
For further description of the symbols used in the fault tree, see Aven 
(2006) or Høyland & Rausand (2004). 
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Appendix E. Input data 
 
Components in the 
BOP control system 
Undetected 
failure rate 
(hours) 
B generic 
(PDS and 
IEC) 
PTIF  
(hours) 
(PDS) 
Reference 
Rig Floor l and Tool 
Pusher Panel (1oo2) 
2,00E-07 0,03 0,00001 OLF 070. ESD 
push down 
button 
Standard industrial 
(PLC) - single system. 
CCC (1004) 
5,00E-06 0,07 0,0005 PDS Data 
Handbook 
(2010) 
Hardwired safety 
system-single system. 
(SEP).I/O (1oo4) 
1,00E-07 0,03 0,000005 PDS Data 
Handbook 
(2010) 
Hydraulic Control 
Module. Solenoid / pilot 
valve 
8,00E-07 0,1 0,0001 PDS Data 
Handbook 
(2010) 
Umbilical 
hydraulic/chemical 
line(per line) (1002) 
4,00E-08 0,05 0,0005 OREDA 
(2009) 
Yellow Pod/ Blue pod, 
loss of all function one 
pod 
1,04E-05 0,03 0,0001 SINTEF- 
Reliability 
BOP study – 
Holand (1999) 
Annular Preventer, 
failed to close 
5,59E-06 0,03 0,0001 SINTEF- 
Reliability 
BOP study – 
Holand (1999) 
Ram Preventer, failed to 
close 
2,58E-06 0,03 0,0001 SINTEF- 
Reliability 
BOP study – 
Holand (1999) 
Blind Shear Ram, 
function failure 2,58E-06 0,03 0,0001 
SINTEF- 
Reliability 
BOP study – 
Holand (1999) 
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Appendix F. Hazard Plotting 
The method is based on the estimation of the hazard Z(t) using so – called 
Nelson estimator,        
The result from the Hazard plotting is shown below. 
 
 
For a more detailed description of the method, see Aven (2006) or Høyland 
& Rausand (2004). 
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Appendix G. Critical values of the Chi square distribution 
 
 
